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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










DEREK EUGENE SPRIGGS, 
    Appellant 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA  
(1:12-CR-0300-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
______________ 
 
 Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 9, 2014 
______________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, GREENAWAY, JR., and BARRY, Circuit Judges 






                                                          
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
    
 
  2 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge 
 Derek Spriggs (“Spriggs”) appeals his judgment of conviction on the basis that 
inadmissible hearsay evidence introduced during the trial was not harmless error and 
contributed to his guilty verdict.  Because we agree with the District Court that the 
admission of the impermissible hearsay evidence was harmless, we will affirm the 
District Court’s judgment of conviction. 
I.  Factual and Procedural History 
 We write primarily for the benefit of the parties and recount only the facts 
essential to our discussion. 
 Spriggs went to trial in the Middle District of Pennsylvania on two firearms counts 
and two drug counts.  At trial, the government called Trooper Jon J. Markle as its final 
witness.  Trooper Markle testified that he was initially contacted by Corporal Scott Wolfe 
who had a confidential informant (“CI”) who could purchase marijuana from an 
unindicted co-conspirator, Joshua Arvelo.  Trooper Markle met with Detective Wolfe and 
the CI.  Trooper Markle explained that the plan involved the CI calling Arvelo to arrange 
a drug transaction for a quarter pound of marijuana for the sum of $460.  Trooper Markle 
testified that this phone call occurred in his presence. Further, the CI and Arvelo were to 
meet in the parking lot at the Harrisburg East Mall, and then travel to Arvelo’s supplier to 
retrieve the marijuana.  Trooper Markle then explained that “[t]he plan changed” once the 
CI arrived in the parking lot. App. 139.  He began to testify that “[t]he confidential 
informant [had] advised that --” when counsel for Spriggs objected on hearsay grounds.  
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Id. 
 The District Court sustained the hearsay objection, and the trooper stated, “I’ll 
rephrase.  The plan changed.  Mr. Arvelo was bringing the supplier with him --.” App. 
140.  Counsel for Spriggs objected again, but her objection was overruled.  Trooper 
Markle also testified that members of the surveillance team observed Arvelo drive into 
the parking lot with a male individual, later identified as Spriggs, in the passenger seat.  
Trooper Markle and the other officers then approached Arvelo’s car in order to remove 
Spriggs from the vehicle.  He told Spriggs to put his hands up, but observed Spriggs 
move his right hand towards his right pocket area as though trying to hide something or 
dispose of an object.  At this point, Spriggs was arrested and searched.  Spriggs had a 
gun, an ounce of marijuana, a digital scale, a cell phone, and $89 in cash in his 
possession.   
During deliberations, the jury submitted a note to the Court. The note stated that 
they “[n]eed[ed the] transcript of testimony related to CI and change of plans to deliver 
the drugs.  Instead of bringing buyer to supplier, was [sic] there exact statements 
indicating supplier would come along?  Were these statements from the CI or did law 
enforcement listen in to the conversation?”  Id. at 245.  Upon receipt of this note, the 
District Court stated that it “should have probably granted [defense counsel’s] objection 
because . . . it was hearsay.”  Id. at 247.  The District Court then brought in the jury and 
responded to the jury’s note by stating:  “There are no exact statements in the record 
indicating what the change of plans were.  The CI did not testify to the change of plans.  
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Arvelo did not specify exactly what the change of plans were.  The trooper only listened 
in to the conversation when the initial plan was set up.  Are you satisfied with that?”  Id. 
at 256.   
While the foreperson was unequivocally satisfied, another juror interjected and 
said, “My understanding, was there no mention once the change of plan took place, was 
there no mention in that, instead of our going there, and that’s the first part of it, I’m 
bringing the supplier with me, by anyone? Did the trooper say that is what he was told 
by the informant, I’m bringing the supplier with me?”  Id. at 256-57.  The District Court 
responded that “[a]nything that the trooper testified to that he heard from someone else 
is hearsay and not admissible.”  Id. at 257.  The questioning juror now appeared to be 
satisfied and said, “[a]nd it’s inadmissible, okay.”  Id. 
At the close of a two-day trial, the jury found Spriggs guilty of all counts 
contained in the indictment except possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 
Spriggs filed a post-trial motion seeking a new trial, which was denied.  The District 
Court found that although Trooper Markle’s statement was inadmissible hearsay, it 
constituted harmless error in light of the additional “substantial” evidence the jury had 
to consider.  In addition, any error was harmless and further mitigated by the curative 
instruction given by the Court in response to the jury’s questions.  
The District Court sentenced Spriggs to an aggregate term of imprisonment of 
240 months, representing a downward variance of 120 months.  Spriggs filed a timely 
notice of appeal.  
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over challenges that implicate the Confrontation Clause, and if we find a 
violation, we consider whether the error was harmless.  United States v. Lore, 430 F.3d 
190, 208-09 (3d Cir. 2005).  Because the nature of the error in this case was testimonial, 
and therefore constitutional, we will affirm the District Court if we find that the error is 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Davis, 561 F.3d 159, 
165 (3d Cir. 2009); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (where a 




 Spriggs argues that the District Court erred by admitting Trooper Markle’s 
testimonial statement regarding the change in plans noting that Arvelo would bring “the 
supplier with him to the location.”  App. 140.  It is undisputed that this statement is 
hearsay, it is testimonial, and as such it is inadmissible.  Thus, the only question before us 
is whether the admission of such evidence amounted to harmless error.  “[B]efore a 
federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief 
that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.   
 To determine whether the error was harmless, we must look at the properly 
admitted evidence to evaluate whether there was enough to support the conviction 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.  See United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 
2005) (holding a Confrontation Clause violation was harmless error because “the jury 
verdict . . . would have been the same . . . had [the constitutionally unsound] statements 
not been admitted . . . .”).  As stated in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993), 
when determining whether an error is harmless, “[t]he inquiry . . . is not whether, in a 
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but 
whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the 
error.”   
 Spriggs’ argument relies on the assumption that Arvelo’s testimony was already 
suspect because he was a cooperator.  He posits that Trooper Markle’s inadmissible 
statement bolstered Arvelo’s credibility, ultimately leading the jury to believe Arvelo, 
which it may not otherwise have done.  We disagree.  When we apply the harmless error 
analysis, as articulated in Chapman and Sullivan, to the facts of this case we find that the 
error in admitting Trooper Markle’s statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.   
 Here, Trooper Markle’s single statement about Spriggs being the supplier was not 
critical to the Government’s case.  Arvelo testified about his relationship with Spriggs, 
whereby Spriggs supplied him with marijuana and Arvelo then sold it.  Arvelo also 
testified about Spriggs supplying him with marijuana on the day in question.  Further, the 
physical evidence corroborated Arvelo’s testimony that Spriggs was his supplier.  When 
he was arrested, Spriggs had a number of the tools of the narcotics trafficking trade on his 
person, including the loaded firearm, an additional ounce of marijuana, and a digital 
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scale.  There were also phone records that established communication between the CI and 
Arvelo, immediately followed by contact between Arvelo and Spriggs at the time of the 
drug transaction.  Spriggs also went to the parking lot with Arvelo for the drug 
transaction with the CI, but remained in the car while Arvelo and the CI met.  This was 
consistent with Trooper Markle’s testimony that that suppliers prefer to be close to their 
product or money, but not so close that they can be identified by customers.   
 Moreover, while the jury did question the District Court about the statement at 
issue in this appeal, the District Court mitigated this issue by instructing the jury that 
“[a]nything that the trooper testified to that he heard from someone else is hearsay and 
not admissible.”  App. 257.  The jurors understood this missive, because one of them 
verbally responded in open court by saying, “[a]nd it’s inadmissible, okay.”  Id.  The law 
presumes that juries “will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence 
inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury 
will be unable to follow the court’s instructions, and a strong likelihood that the effect of 
the evidence would be devastating to the defendant[] . . . .”  Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 
756, 766 n.8 (1987) (citations and internal quotations marks omitted); see also United 
States v. Hakim, 344 F.3d 324, 326 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We generally presume that juries 
follow instructions given by the District Court . . . .”).      
 Because the evidence lawfully admitted against Spriggs was overwhelming, and 
the effect of the inadmissible statement was mitigated by the District Court’s instruction, 
we conclude that the erroneous admission of Trooper Markle’s testimony was harmless 
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beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.    
 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of conviction of the 
District Court.    
